A Fine "State of Affairs"

This is a note to myself before I run out the door:

Dear Self,

Wittgenstein's notion of a "state of affairs" attempts to excludes the "state of affairs" of the subjective observer or person who states a proposition.

This is how Science wishes the propositions of science to be, and it reflects other peoples' work: Moritz Schlick, Carnap, and the Vienna Circle among other.
It also is eeriely similar to the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Theory, which I find very interesting, and not the slightest bit  Bohr-ing.

(note to self, laugh loudly here!)

However, in most other situations, a "state of affairs" usually includes the state of affairs of the intelligent individuals who observe and propound the propositions.

The question is how a "state of affairs" differs from the one type of proposition to the other, for it seems obvious that the second type of proposition is a bit more than merely a first type - Wittgensteinian - proposition with some added information about the person making it.

Certainly, all my emotional nuances and quirks constitute  "a state of affairs"; my evaluations are "facts";
thus, some states of affairs are eliminated under Wittgenstein et alii. Interesting
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